Year of war

Follow the 600-mile front line between Ukrainian and Russian forces

Over the last year, the war in Ukraine has morphed from a multi-front invasion that included Kyiv in the north to a conflict of attrition largely concentrated along a 600-mile stretch in the east and south.

Ukrainian troops pushed the Russians back from Kyiv last spring. Russian President Vladimir Putin then shifted the focus of his military’s fighting to what is now the front line, while still launching airstrikes across the country. Analysts note that Moscow’s capabilities appear to be declining — though it now has more than 320,000 troops in Ukraine, according to Ukrainian and Western intelligence, roughly double the number at the start of the invasion.

“The Russian military will be throwing poorly trained and potentially poorly equipped forces forward,” said Max Bergmann, director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.“It is doubtful they will be able to conduct complex offensive maneuvers.”

Nevertheless, the war is poised to be punishing and bloody as it enters its second year. “[Putin] likely hopes to severely degrade Ukraine’s forces and break their will to continue,” Bergmann added.

BELARUS

POL.

RUSSIA

Kyiv

UKRAINE

Dnieper

Held by

separatists

MOL.

ROMANIA

Crimea

100 MI

Black

Sea

BELARUS

POLAND

RUSSIA

Kyiv

Kharkiv

Dnieper

UKRAINE

Held by

separatists

MOL.

ROMANIA

Kherson

Crimea

100 MI

Black

Sea

BELARUS

POLAND

RUSSIA

Kyiv

Kharkiv

Dnieper

UKRAINE

Held by

separatists

MOL.

ROMANIA

Kherson

Sea of

Azov

100 MI

Black

Sea

Crimea

BELARUS

POLAND

RUSSIA

Kyiv

Kharkiv

Dnieper

UKRAINE

Held by

separatists

MOL.

ROMANIA

Kherson

Sea of

Azov

100 MILES

Crimea

Black

Sea

BELARUS

Controlled

by Russia

POL.

RUSSIA

Kyiv

UKRAINE

Dnieper

MOL.

ROMANIA

100 MI

Black

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BELARUS

Controlled

by Russia

POLAND

RUSSIA

Kyiv

Kharkiv

Dnieper

UKRAINE

MOL.

ROMANIA

Kherson

100 MI

Black

Sea

BELARUS

Controlled

by Russia

POLAND

RUSSIA

Kyiv

Kharkiv

Dnieper

UKRAINE

MOL.

ROMANIA

Kherson

Sea of

Azov

100 MI

Black

Sea

BELARUS

Controlled

by Russia

POLAND

RUSSIA

Kyiv

Kharkiv

Dnieper

UKRAINE

MOL.

ROMANIA

Kherson

Sea of

Azov

100 MILES

Black

Sea

BELARUS

POL.

RUSSIA

Kyiv

UKRAINE

Dnieper

MOL.

ROMANIA

100 MI

Black

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BELARUS

POLAND

RUSSIA

Kyiv

Kharkiv

Dnieper

UKRAINE

MOL.

ROMANIA

Kherson

100 MI

Black

Sea

BELARUS

POLAND

RUSSIA

Kyiv

Kharkiv

Dnieper

UKRAINE

MOL.

ROMANIA

Kherson

Sea of

Azov

100 MI

Black

Sea

BELARUS

POLAND

RUSSIA

Kyiv

Kharkiv

Dnieper

UKRAINE

MOL.

ROMANIA

Kherson

Sea of

Azov

100 MILES

Black

Sea

Before the full-scale invasion, Russia controlled Crimea (invaded and illegally annexed by the Kremlin in 2014) and the separatist-held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine, part of the Donbas region.

This was the front line on March 15, 2022. Roughly a month after the invasion, Russia controlled a swath of Ukraine’s north and significant territory in the southeast.

By Sept. 15, Russia had retreated from the north, and was on the run from a counteroffensive in northeast Kharkiv Oblast.

While there have been minor territorial changes, the front line has remained mostly the same since mid-November, following Russia’s withdrawal from Kherson.

This front line stretches from the grassy steppes of the northeast, along the Dnieper River all the way to the Black Sea. An expanse of territory so large is hard to defend completely, so conflict is concentrated in certain key areas.

260 MILES

SHOWN

THE NORTH

The push for Donbas

260 miles

SHOWN

THE NORTH

The push for Donbas

Russian forces seized a large part of the Kharkiv Region at the start of the war. They held it until September when a surprise Ukrainian military offensive retook most of the territory. Russia continues to conduct strikes here, forcing Kyiv to maintain troop presence.

Kyiv’s September counteroffensive also liberated Kupyansk and Izyum, which were important lily pads for Russia’s goal to push south. Capturing Kupyansk means Ukraine could push farther east across the Oskil River.

Russia tried to press west through the Bilohorivka river crossing in May and incurred major losses, turning many pundits back home against the war. In June, however, Russia took Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, part of Putin’s push to capture the Donbas. This was a big loss for the Ukrainian army.

The most intense fighting is happening in Bakhmut and Soledar. While Russian forces are making incremental gains, there are questions over whether those advances are doing more harm to their military than benefiting it strategically.

Western artillery has afforded Ukraine capabilities it didn’t have before the war. While territory around Donetsk has been solidly held by Russian separatists since 2014, Ukraine used HIMARS rockets to reach and kill Russian soldiers celebrating the new year in Makiivka on Jan. 1.

A long Russian siege secured Mariupol for Moscow last spring. But that region could become more contested this year with a potential Ukrainian offensive in the south, analysts said.

The front line pivots about 30 miles away from Donetsk, moving southwest.

Infrastructure and geography could have a major impact on Ukraine and Russia’s ability to gain territory across this stretch. For example, the Dnieper River is a significant barrier to both sides.

This region is also of particular importance to Putin, who wants to secure a “land bridge” between mainland Russia and Crimea. The bridge connecting Crimea with Russia has been attacked by Ukraine.

450 MILES

SHOWN

THE SOUTH

Ukraine’s big bet

450 MILES

SHOWN

THE SOUTH

Ukraine’s big bet

Vuhledar is a strategic town that connects the eastern front with Russian controlled areas in the south. Russia launched intense attacks into this area but Ukraine has inflicted significant losses on its troops.

Melitopol is a key city occupied by Russia. Analysts view it as a likely target for a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive. Taking the territory here would cut off Russia’s east-west supply lines. Russia has prepared with trenches and fortifications.

In Enerhodar, the Russian-controlled nuclear power plant — Europe’s largest — remains a source of radiation risk, especially if this area becomes a zone for heavy fighting.

Further south, the Nova Kakhovka dam provided one of the only remaining crossings over the Dnieper River. Since it was seriously damaged during fighting this summer, neither side can transport heavy military equipment across it.

Kherson was the only major city Russia was able to capture before Ukraine retook it in November. Bridges were key for both sides in the fight. Ukraine initially struck them with long-range artillery before winning back the territory. In late November, Russia retaliated, striking the same crossings while in retreat.

Even though Ukraine controls the port cities of Mykolaiv and Kherson, sending Ukrainian goods along the river from here is too risky in part because Russia holds the Kinburn Peninsula, a crucial commercial chokepoint. The landform’s tip is just two miles from mainland Ukraine.

While geographical features continue to play a role in the war, the sheer scale of the territory means neither side can make gains without a major advantage in weaponry or force size.

Despite sending hundreds of thousands of conscripts to war, Russia has lost nearly half of its battle tanks in the fighting, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Western governments have sent weapons to Ukraine since the beginning of the conflict, and have promised more, including battle tanks. But that supply could diminish later in this second year of fighting. Public support for sending aid and weapons to Ukraine has declined in the United States. Other Western governments have been slow to provide any sizable shipments.

“The real center of gravity for the outcome of this war is not on the Ukrainian battlefield,” said George Barros, a military researcher at the Institute for the Study of War. “The real place is actually in the decision-making space in Western capitals. Because the moment we decide that we are not going to empower Ukraine, Ukraine will lose the war.”

About this story

Front line as of Feb. 8. The north and south close-up maps show overlapping front line sections. Data for the front line, control areas, Russian advances, and areas reclaimed by Ukraine is from the Institute for the Study of War. Brady Africk, who analyzed satellite imagery from Copernicus Open Access Hub, provided fortifications data, which does not include all fortifications in Ukraine; some defenses predate Russia’s full-scale invasion. Base map data from OpenStreetMap. Satellite images from Copernicus Sentinel-2. The elevation layer was created using Peak Map, a tool by Andrei Kashcha.

Editing by Emily M. Eng, Reem Akkad, Manuel Canales and Tim Meko. Copy editing by Angela Mecca.